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tive action in placing the fraudulent party in a position to perpetrate the deed.
Furthermore, the owner seems to be in a more advantageous position to protect
the goods. 2 6 These considerations apply as logically in cases involving impersonal agents as in those involving bona fide purchasers. In addition it would
seem that the agent's compensation would not make title investigation economically practical.
The commercial wisdom of expanding the protection for agents has not gone
unchallenged. It has been pointed out that if brokers are held liable to the
owner for selling encumbered securities and goods, they will examine the title
carefully and thereby -afford a good deal of protection to owners of negotiable
instruments. It is contended that the resulting delay in transactions due to such
a requirement is minimal on the whole since almost all honest sellers have such
familiar relations with brokers that it would be unnecessary to check their
titles. 27 A realistic survey of agents, commission brokers, and factors in the
commercial society of today would seem to indicate otherwise. Non-discriminatory statutes, such as the Packers and Stockyard Act, have further decreased
personal relations between agents and principals. Furthermore, making the
broker liable in order to increase his vigilance may serve to lessen the owner's
incentive to be vigilant in many situations where placing the duty on the owner
would be more fruitful in preventing the loss.
From the standpoint of sound commercial policy a more convincing argument for placing the burden of the risk of these losses on the agencies is that
they are in a relatively better position than the owners to insure against the loss
and account for the insurance as a cost item in determining fees and commissions. The brokers can thus assume a cost determining and allocation of risk
function that, in most cases, cannot be undertaken by sellers with a high degree
8
of certainty because of the smaller number of transactions usually involved.'
Zoning-Municipal Rezoning Amendment Invalidated-"Best Use" Test
Adopted by State Supreme Court-[Illinois].-In i94i the plaintiff, seeking an
industrial site, purchased part of a fifty-three acre vacant tract of land, originally zoned in 1923 for manufacturing use. This purchase is shown as A on the accompanying diagram. In 1923 the tract was occupied by two brick-manufacturing companies. This use was later abandoned. Facing the tract on bordering
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Cowen v. Pressprich, i17 N.Y. Misc. 663

(1922)

illustrates such a situation. Judge

Lehman's dissent was adopted by the Appellate Division in reversing the decision holding the
defendant liable for conversion. i94 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1922).
27 Warren, Trover and Conversion, an Essay, 95 (1936); Warren, Margin Customers, 129
(1941). Professor Warren also argues that it is not sensible to hold the negotiable instrument
broker not liable for conversion while the chattel agent is held liable for conversion. The chattel
owner as a result is given a remedy against both buyer and agent while the negotiable instrument owner is left with a claim against no one but the thief. Ibid. at 132, 133.
28See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk; 38 Yale L. J. 584, 720
(1929).
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streets were commercial-use districts. A number of the dwellings in these districts had been allowed to deteriorate and three factories occupied portions of
the commercial strips to the west. Two of the plants had been built within one
year prior to the plaintiff's purchase. The surrounding area to the north, west,
and east was residential; the land to the south was occupied and zoned for indus-
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trial use. In 1942, after the plaintiff purchased tract A, but before he began construction, the City Council of Chicago passed a comprehensive zoning amendment which included a provision rezoning a 125-foot strip on the western side
of the tract as property limited to apartment use.' The area is indicated on the
accompanying diagram. In 1943 the City Council passed a spot-zoning amendment which applied to the remainder of the fifty-three acres rezoning the entire
area for apartment use.2 The plaintiff brought suit to set aside the new zoning
x Comprehensive Amendment to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, Chicago Rev. Code
(1946) § 194A.
2Chicago Rev. Code (1946) § 194A-i.
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restrictions as constituting a taking of property without due process of law. The
lower court upheld the plaintiff's contention. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Illinois, held, that since the trend of the immediate neighborhood surrounding
the fifty-three acre tract had been industrial for the previous twenty years, the
rezoning ordinance was void with respect to such tract. Judgment affirmed,
2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago.3
Studies made by the Chicago Regional Planning Association in x938, fifteen
years after Chicago's original zoning ordinance, indicated that the amount of
commercial and industrial area provided would meet the needs of a city with
ten million residents.4 Chicago was not alone in planning and hoping for an industrial boom.5 Generally in the early days of zoning, authorities elsewhere were
unnecessarily liberal in setting aside land for industrial development while greatly underzoning for residential use. 6 Overzoning tends to have two immediate
effects. First, since the need for industrial area is far below the available supply
the surplus is left for whatever other use its owners can make of it. Being without zoning restrictions that can apply, the surplus industrial property is left
literally in the same status as before zoning, to develop under no plan at all.7
Second, since the areas available for industrial and commercial use are large and
widely scattered, an unnecessarily large number of residentially zoned sections
become less desirable because they border industrial areas. These effects are
readily observable in Chicago where they have been an important factor in the
3395
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i38, 69 N.E. 2d 827 (1946).

4 This estimate

was made on a basis of fifty feet of industrial frontage per hundred population-a figure arrived at by comparison with the needs of other cities. The Amendment of
Zoning Ordinances, 4 Legal Notes on Local Government 1o (x938). In 1923, 28.64 square miles
were zoned for commercial and industrial uses but in 3936 only 12.54 square miles were used
commercially. Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Regulations, 9 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 477, 490 (1942).
SThe surplus of industrially zoned land is readily understandable when it is realized that
the market value of such property was from two to three times that of residential land in 1923.
Therefore special interests exerted considerable pressure to increase the value of their land.
In the instant case the plaintiff's tract was valued in 1942 at $30,0oo as industrial and approximately $12,ooo as residential property. See Twentieth Century Fund, American Housing 124 (1944). The spirit of the period is indicated in the statement that "it was recognized
that the city depends upon its commerce and industry, that retail business service and residential developments are the important by-products. Where properties now used for residence
are best suited to manufacturing purposes and where the improvements have badly depreciated, they have in many cases been zoned for manufacturing, that use being regarded as the
highest and best use of the land. Other properties in the outlying areas now undeveloped have
been zoned for manufacturing, so that the expansion of the city's industries will not be jeopardized. Indeed, such procedure will encourage the establishment of new industries." Tentative Report of Chicago Zoning Commission 5 (Jan. 5, 1923).
6
Bassett, Zoning 56 (394o).
7Since a piece of property may be employed for any more restricted use than its zoning
classification, development will be haphazard when actual use is of a more restricted character than that permitted by the classification.
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spread of slum and blight areas.' Persons seeking residential land refuse to invest in and improve the unprotected areas and move to outlying regions instead.
One of the major problems facing large metropolitan cities today is to prevent
migration to the suburbs. Zoning, properly used, is one of the instruments necessary to encourage and protect residential development within a city. Proper use
today requires rezoning to establish a reasonable proportion between residential
and industrial use areas, to protect slum clearance and redevelopment efforts and
to adjust the land-use pattern to some "master plan" such as commissions in
nearly all major cities have adopted as a guide to city development.9
The Chicago Corporation Counsel chose to test the city's first major attempt
at rezoning ° in a situation containing political implications disadvantageous
to the city's cause. In the past the Chicago City Council has zoned in a manner
open to criticism."' Evidence introduced by the plaintiff in the Irving Park Bldg.
case tended to show that the tract involved was rezoned more as a result of
political pressure than as a consequence of the city's rezoning plan.12 Witnesses
for the plaintiff and the defendant testified that the purpose behind both rezoning ordinances was to preserve the tract for future use as a city park, not to
make it available for apartment use. The city was attempting to use zoning to
accomplish the function of condemnation proceedings. The plaintiff had good
cause to complain at such tactics, since by rezoning the city prevented him from
using the property as he desired, yet by waiting to institute condemnation proceedings at its own leisure it prevented him from disposing of the property to
8 Some other influences found in nearly all the central cities of metropolitan areas which
contribute to the same trend are the grid system of platting which permits every street to
become a traffic thoroughfare; rigid building codes which force builders from otherwise desirable sites to areas beyond code jurisdiction; and high taxes which result from and, in a chain
reaction, further the trend. Twentieth Century Fund, American Housing x6-23 (N944).
9Bassett, The Master Plan (i938).
,0The 1942 ordinance was so comprehensive that the plaintiff attacked it as being not an
amendment under the enabling act but rather an entirely new zoning ordinance. Since the procedure necessary to enact a new zoning ordinance was not followed, the plaintiff claimed that
the enactment was void in its entirety. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff
on this point. 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 152, 69 N.E. 2d 827, 834
(1946).
"1Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems in the Law of City Planning and Zoning,
24 Ill. L. Rev. 135, 146 (1929); Zoning Ordinances-Amendment, 25 11. L. Rev. 817, 821
(1931); Metropolitan Housing Council, Zoning and Zoning Administration in Chicago 8 (1938).
A strongly critical discussion of Chicago zoning by political fix appeared in I2American
Society of Planning Officials Newsletter 65, 67 (1946), commenting on a newspaper report
concerning eight recent zoning cases. Five charges were quashed, two were continued, one
fine of $iwas levied. Chicago Sun, p. 21, col. 7 (July 19, 1946).
"2The court said that "shortly after the plaintiff purchased the property in question, news
of the transaction and the proposed plan to erect a factory on the property was circulated
among residents of the 4oth ward. A group of these residents started some agitation to have the
tract rezoned in order to prevent the plaintiff from carrying out its plans. The 3942 amendment
was conceived as a stop-gap to prevent development of the property until the entire 53-acre
tract could be converted into a park or playground." 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill.
138, 146, 69 N.E. ad 827, 831 (1946).
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the only purchaser willing to take it as rezoned. The city could be thus squarely
accused of using rezoning in the instant case for strictly political dog-in-the3
manger purposes.
Faced with the charge that desire for a park was the real motive behind the
rezoning, the city failed to offer a justification based upon the over-all picture of
its future zoning plans. The plaintiff introduced two expert witnesses, both well
known Chicago real-estate appraisers, who testified that the tract was "unfit for
apartment use" because of the character of the adjacent commercial and industrial property and the "condition of the soil," that the uses in the bordering
commercial strips made the "trend" industrial in the neighborhood, that "the
highest and best private use" of this land was "industrial," and that the plaintiff would lose approximately $2o,ooo in land valuation if the ordinances were
sustained. The city introduced two expert witnesses, a local real-estate appraiser
and the executive director of the Chicago Plan Commission, who gave opinion
evidence that the "highest and best use" of the tract was "residential." One of
the city's witnesses testified that a program based on studies of the Chicago Plan
Commission had been conceived for the improvement of the entire ward, including the fifty-three acre tract. 4 But the corporation counsel failed to emphasize
this point. He did not indicate the problem faced by the city in its attempt to
plan orderly metropolitan development through the use of rezoning. Instead he
permitted the issue to remain on the narrow point of "the highest and best use"
for the particular tract of land as shown by the "trend" of the immediately surrounding blocks rather than the predominantly residential character of the entire ward. It would seem a fair criticism to state that the city selected an inappropriate case to test its first comprehensive rezoning ordinance in view of the
undercurrent of questionable political activity accompanied by enactment of a
spot-zoning ordinance of dubious virtue. Having done so, it also failed to press
arguments that were in its favor.
The Illinois Supreme Court did not speak in terms narrowly restricted to the
questionable character of the two zoning amendments as they applied to the
fifty-three acre tract. Rather the court proceeded to decide whether these
amendments were good zoning, establishing its own test of desirability. The
court adopted a narrow test which considers the trend of the immediately surrounding blocks, ruling out consideration of the tract in relation to the entire
community.'5 Having determined the proper criterion upon which to base a
zoning ordinance, the court made its own value judgment that the "highest and
13The Chicago Park District has now acquired title to eighteen acres of the fifty-three acre
tract, and condemnation proceedings are pending on the balance. Chicago Park District v.
Trust Co. of Chicago, Doc. No. 46 C 6477, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
'4 Abstract of Record 457-59, 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69
N.E. 2d 827 (1946).
isAs shown on the diagram, the court considered the immediately adjacent commercial
strips to the north and west and the industrial areas to the south. The court did not find
that the completely residential nature of the areas to the north, east, and west was important.
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best use" of the property in question was industrial and therefore the rezoning
ordinances were void as regards the plaintiff's tract.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not been consistent in its approach to zon-

ing.' 6 The court has asserted that it is not a zoning commission and that "it is

primarily the province of the municipal body to which the zoning function is
committed to draw the line of demarcation as to the use and purpose to which
property shall be assigned or placed, and it is neither the province nor the duty
of courts to interfere with the discretion with which such bodies are invested,
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of that discretion."' 7 The holding of
the instant case indicates a considerable shift from this policy. The decision in
the Irving ParkBldg. case was a usurpation of the legislative function since the
court not only rejected the zoning ordinances before it for consideration, but
also in effect enacted its own ordinance as a replacement. Such action is particularly unfortunate since the court can deal with only a fragment of a zoning
plan in any single case. Judge-made zoning can never result in comprehensive
and intelligent city planning.
Other courts in recent cases have taken a more realistic view of the problem
facing city planners. In Cassel Really Co. v. Omaha,'" the Nebraska Supreme
Court considered a case where a tract, which had first been commercially zoned,
was rezoned as residential property after the previously existing commercial use
had been abandoned. This action decreased the market value of the property.
The contention was made that since commercial establishments continued
across the street from the land, the rezoning was arbitrary and unreasonable.
If the Nebraska court had restricted its examination of the case to the "immediately surrounding" blocks it could easily have held the ordinance to be
confiscatory. But the court refused to base its decision on such narrow grounds.
Rather, it pointed out that the area "in every direction for many blocks from
the location involved ....was zoned, used and being developed for residence
purposes."'9 Therefore the rezoning ordinance was recognized as a valid exercise
of Omaha's municipal police power.
,6Inone line of cases the court has asserted that if the validity of the legislative classification
in zoning cases is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control and
the court will not interfere. Mercer Lumber Co. v. Glencoe, 390 Ill.
i38, 6o N.E. 2d 9r3 (i945);
Zadwomy v. Chicago, 380 Ill.
470, 44 N.E. 2d 426 (1942); Neef v. Springfield, 380 Ill. 275,
43 N.E. 2d 947 (1942); Evanston Best Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill.
207, i6 N.E. 2d iWi (1938);
Minkus v. Pond, 326 111. 467, i58 N.E. 121 (1927); Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill.
84, 149 N.E. 784
(1925). This doctrine is in accordance with the view of the United States Supreme Court.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.365 (1926). In an opposing line of cases the Illinois Supreme Court has given little weight to legislative judgment and instead has taken a decidedly
critical view of zoning, establishing in each case its own standard rather than that of the city
council. La Grange v. Leitch, 377 Ill 99, 35 N.E. 2d 346 (i941); Harmon v. Peoria, 373 Ill.
594, 27 N.E. 2d 525 (i940); Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill.
507, 25 N.E. 2d 62 (i94O); Reschke v.
Winnetka, 363 Ill. 478, 2N.E. 2d 718 (1936); Tews v. Woolhiser, 352 Ill. 212, 185 N.E. 827
(x933); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, i8o N.E. 767 (1932).
" Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill.
467, 48o, I58 N.E. 121, i26 (1927).
'8 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W. 2d 6oo (t944).
19Ibid., at 762 and 6o5.
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In a recent New York case before the Appellate Division, Ulmer Park Realty
Co. v. City of New York,20 the plaintiff contended that the zoning classification
and use of neighboring properties made impractical the use of its land as zoned
for residential purposes. Had the court looked for the "highest and best use" of
the particular piece of property, a holding for the plaintiff might logically have
followed. But the opinion flatly refused to consider the "best" use for the land,
stating in a memorandum opinion that "proof that the property could be more
profitably or more beneficially used for industrial purposes than for residential
purposes is not sufficient to warrant a declaration that a zoning resolution is
confiscatory and unconstitutional. Where the suitability of plaintiff's property
for residential use presents a debatable question the court may not substitute
'
its judgment for that of the local legislative body. 21
A similar view was taken by the California Supreme Court in Wilkins v. Sanl
Bernardino.22 There the plaintiff owned a block of land, one frontage being zoned
for two-family dwellings and commercial use, the other frontage on the next
street being zoned for one-family houses. The plaintiff attempted to use the
entire block for two-family buildings. The court, recognizing the threat to efficient city planning raised by restricting relevant zoning considerations to the
physical characteristics of the immediately surrounding property, stated that
"the drawing of boundary lines of zones within a municipality must of necessity
be more or less arbitrary."23 The court further asserted that "fixing boundaries
of a zone is a legislative act committed to the sound discretion of the legislative
body ....[and] the fact that nearby business property has the same characteristics as the parcel involved in the proceeding does not justify the court in substituting its judgment for the legislative judgment. The mere fact that business
property is located across the street or even adjoining the residential property
involved does not determine that the ordinance is invalid. '' 24
If the Illinois Supreme Court limits its holding in the Irving Park Bldg. case
to the peculiar facts relating to political activity, the court can still consistently
follow its decisions which recognize the importance of zoning to city welfare.
But if the case becomes general zoning law inIllinois, the efforts of city councils
to readjust their zoning maps will be effectively defeated. Illinois city planners
will be left without an essential working tool. Since slum clearance and urban
redevelopment plans must presuppose adequate zoning protection, 5 such im20

270 App.
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1o44,

63 N.Y.S. 2d 143 (1946).

21Ibid.,

at io44 and x44.This decision is in accord with recent New York Court of Appeals
decisions. Franklin v. Floral Park, 294 N.Y. 862, 62 N.E. 2d 488 (1945); Kraft v. Hastings,
285 N.Y. 639, 33 N.E. 2d 558 (1941).
23

i62 P. 2d 711 (Cal., 1945).
Ibid., at 714.

24

Ibid., at 7M7.

25Chicago Plan Commission, Housing Goals of Chicago i36 (1946); Urban Redevelopment, 54 Yale L.J. ii6 (1944).
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provement efforts will be seriously handicapped. Continued growth of blight
districts will be aided by requiring the city to justify a zoning ordinance on the
basis of an immediately surrounding area. By requiring the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proof in showing that any questioned rezoning ordinance has no relation to the development of an entire community, the court could help, instead
of hinder, conservation of city property value. In the present housing shortage
the cities are already experiencing difficulty in securing sufficient suitable land
for residential construction. The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court may
very well constitute another exasperating obstacle. 6 When the merits of a
rezoning amendment are debatable, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
the legality of the city council's action both as a matter of sound social policy
and fundamental constitutional law.
2 "The City Council should immediately undertake a thorough revision of the zoning ordinance in order to eliminate unnecessary and unwise restrictions with regard to the location
of residential and apartment dwellings. It is particularly essential that many areas now unreasonably restricted to commercial and industrial purposes be opened up to housing developments." Mayor's Emergency Housing Committee Report (Chicago) 7 (Mar. Ii, 1947).

